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The Challenge to Religious Tolerance:
Fundamentalists’ Resistance to a Non-Muslim Leader in Indonesia
Hisanori Kato
Introduction
The largest mosque in Southeast Asia, called Istiqlal, stands across the street from a
Catholic cathedral in the center of the Indonesian capital, Jakarta. These two major
religious buildings in Indonesia stand in a rather peaceful setting. In addition, Candi
Borobudur, which is located in Central Java, is the largest and oldest single Buddhist
monument in the world, with more than a 1,200-year-long history. Despite the fact that
Indonesia is the most populous Muslim nation in the world,1 Indonesia has boasted of
its religious tolerance for centuries.
Indonesia’s multi-religious character has necessitated mutual respect and harmonious
co-existence among religions throughout its recorded history. Indonesia’s national
motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, which means unity in diversity,2 constitutes an
ideological pillar of the country. Not only do cultural heritages express mutual
tolerance, but also the political arrangement of the country has been pledged to religious
tolerance since the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia.
In fact, at the end of World War II, the preparatory committee for Indonesia’s
independence drafted a constitution that promised the implementation of Sharia law for
Muslims. However, the sentence that stated this constitutional obligation was deleted
when the constitution was officially promulgated.3 Moreover, the national policy to
respect all religions has been installed as Pancasila in the constitution of the Republic
of Indonesia.4 This political disposition clearly shows Indonesia’s commitment to the
creation of a harmonious society, in which the majority religion, Islam, and other
minority religions can coexist peacefully.

1

According to the official statistics, the proportion of the followers of the six major religions in
Indonesia is as follows: Islam 87.18; Protestant 6.96; Catholic 2.91; Hindu 1.69; Buddhism 0.72;
Confucianism 0.05 and others. See, the official website of National Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat
Statistik) at: http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?searchtabel=Penduduk+Menurut+Kelompok+Umur+dan+Agama+yang+Dianut&tid=320&searchwilayah=Indonesia&wid=0000000000&lang=id
2
This state motto was mentioned in the poetry of Tantular in the time of the Majapahit Kingdom
(1293-1527). The original meaning is “they are different, but they are same”.
3
Robert Cribb and Colin Brown, Modern Indonesia, (London: 1995), 15.
4
Pancasila includes five major principles: Belief in God; National Unity; Humanitarianism; People’s
Sovereignty; Social Justice and Prosperity. The first principle “Belief in God” refers not only to Allah
but also to God of any religion.
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Nonetheless, it is also true that religious tolerance in Indonesia has been disturbed from
time to time in history, such as the nationwide 1998 riots at the time of the fall of the
Suharto regime.5 We witness another example that challenges religious tolerance in
Indonesia in 2017: a politician who is a non-Muslim Christian (Protestant) and of
Chinese descent was running for the governorship in contest with Muslim candidates.
This Chinese-Christian politician, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, or popularly known as
Ahok, has been criticized and accused of blasphemy for his comments on al-Quran
during his campaign in September 2016. As a result, he was defeated in the
gubernatorial election in April 2017 and was sentenced for two years imprisonment for
blasphemy after the election.6
It is important to question whether a long-standing tradition of religious tolerance in
Indonesia has been overturned by this political event. Equally important is that we
explore the influence of religion in relation to the socio-political behavior of people. In
the following parts of this paper, we attempt to find answers to these questions and to
comprehend the meaning of this political event thoroughly.
The Background of Ahok
Ahok rose in political prominence when he paired with Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi,
then the mayor of Surakarta, for vice-governorship of Jakarta in 2012, although his
political career started in 2005, when he was elected to serve as the regent of east
Belitung.7 He was also a member of parliament between 2009 and 2012 until he joined
the gubernatorial race with Jokowi. This newly emerging pair from outside of Jakarta
with business backgrounds gained a great amount of popularity with the masses and
were successfully elected governor and vice-governor, respectively, of Special
Designated Capital Jakarta (or DKI Jakarta) in 2012.
The political path of Jokowi, however, continued to the highest position of the republic,
when he was elected the president of Indonesia in 2014. Consequently, the vicegovernor, Ahok, was elevated to become governor of DKI Jakarta. It was his first
gubernatorial election as a governor in 2017, when he paired with a former mayor of
the east Javanese town of Blitar, Djarot Saiful Hidayat, who became a deputy in Ahok’s
administration in 2014.

5

During that time, ethnically Chinese Indonesian became a target, and a vast amount of Chinese
descendants were victimised by murder, plunder and rape.
6
Ahok is preparing to appeal to the higher court in May 2017 (the time at which this paper is being
written).
7
Belitung is an island near Sumatra and belongs to the province of the Bangka-Belitung Islands.
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During his governorship, Ahok confronted DKI Jakarta parliament members accused
of corruption. He made the decision to make the process more transparent by
broadcasting the meetings live via YouTube. With these novel means regarding
governing DKI Jakarta, Ahok, in spite of his religious and ethnic background, has
become one of the rising stars in Indonesian politics. On the other hand, Ahok has often
been criticized for his outspokenness and straightforwardness, as it is culturally thought
to be more acceptable and polite if one is modest and indirect in Indonesia. However,
Ahok believes it is far more important to be professional than to follow traditional
Indonesian manners.8
Controversial Comment and the Reaction from Muslims
It was widely expected that Ahok would be the first non-Muslim and non-pribumi9
governor of Jakarta until the end of September 2016, as his popularity was high.
However, the tide started to drastically turn for him after he delivered a speech on Pulau
Seribu, an island near Jakarta, during his campaign on 27 September 2016. He explained
the social welfare programs that his government intended to implement and encouraged
the constituency of the island to vote for him. However, during his speech, he
mentioned one of the verses of al-Quran related to the relationship between Muslims
and non-believers such as Christians and Jews. The following is the script of his
comment:
Bapak/Ibu (ladies and gentlemen) may not vote for me, because (you have been)
lied to by (someone using) Surah al-Maidah verse 51 etc. … So if you cannot vote
for me because you are afraid of being condemned to hell you do not need to feel
uneasy as you are being fooled. It is all right.10
Verse 51 of al-Maidah reads as follows: “Believers, take neither the Jews nor the
Christians for your friends. They are friends with one another. Whoever of you seeks
their friendship shall become one of their number. God does not guide the
wrongdoers.”11 This verse is often cited as a theological ground to reject a non-Muslim
leader in a Muslim-dominated community.
After the edited footage of his speech was uploaded on YouTube, severe condemnations
and criticisms of Ahok became ubiquitous, in which Ahok was accused of “insulting”
Islam. Ahok swiftly made a public apology for his comment and attempted to subdue
the antagonistic sentiments targeted at him. His own words read as follows:
8

The author of this paper was told this by Ahok during a meeting with a group of Presidential Friends
of Indonesia on 13 August 2014.
9
Pribumi means native, and it usually refers to an ethnically Indonesian Muslim.
10
Jakarta Post, 10 October 2016. The original script of his speech in Indonesian can be found on the
BBC website at: http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-37996601 (last accessed 5th June 2017)
11
Al-Quran 5-51
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017
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I apologize to Muslims or other people who feel offended. I never intended to insult
Islam or al-Quran. I am not an Islam specialist…. If you watch it (the video), you
know that I have no intention to insult Islam. …. Even people (Muslims) who were
there laughed over my comment.12
Despite Ahok’s effort to minimize the political damage caused by this incident, the
situation became threatening to him as the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI), the
highest Islamic authority in Indonesia, issued a statement to condemn him. The MUI
concluded that Ahok was subject to punishment, as he insulted both Islam and the ulama
(Muslim scholars) in the statement. In the same document, the MUI also encouraged
judicial authorities to take a swift legal action against Ahok.13
It seems that MUI’s statement played an important role in bringing about an emotional
reaction from umat Islam (Islamic community) in Indonesia in the face of Ahok’s
comment. The first mass rally condemning Ahok took place in Jakarta on 14 October
2016, and it is said that around 30,000 to 50,000 people joined the demonstration.14 A
greater number of people joined another Islamic mass movement in Jakarta on 4
November 2016. About 100,000 people gathered at the Istiqlal Mosque for their Friday
prayer and marched to the State Palace nearby. Another mass rally was held on 2
December with about 500,000 participants. These demonstrations were organised by
one of the radical Islamic groups called Front Pembela Islam, better known as FPI.
The concern of President Jokowi’s government was that a possible religiously-driven
riot would cause a serious social division in Indonesia. However, the government
managed to prevent the participants from becoming violent, and thereby avoided
physical destruction of Jakarta. The police and the military deployed 20,000 and 5,000
personnel respectively in order to maintain security in the areas of demonstration. In
addition to the tight security measures, a sermon given by Masaruddin Umar, the imam
of Istiqlal Mosque, seems to have contributed to a rather peaceful movement, for he
emphasized the importance of Muslims not to be “excessive”, as it is stated in alQuran.15

12

Republika, 10 October 2016; The Jakarta Post, 10 October 2016. Some Indonesian parts have been
translated by the author of this paper.
13
The original text is available at: http://www.berita.islamedia.id/2017/02/inilah-tanggapan-lengkapmui-atas-tuduhan-pengacara-ahok-terhadap-ketua-MUI.html
14
Jakarta Post, 3 November 2016.
15
Jakarta Post, 4 November 2016.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/8
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It is possible to understand the demonstrations as opportunities for Muslims to express
their indignation and hatred towards a non-Muslim leader, Ahok. Yet, it is also true
that it was an occasion for the whole umat Islam in Indonesia to reaffirm their solidarity
among Muslims, although we cannot deny the fact that there was sentiment against
Ahok during the rally. Ahmad Rais, an executive member of the Ma’arif Institute in
Jakarta stated that “many people joined the Friday prayer and rally on 4 November
because they merely like to feel the religious atmosphere.16 Andi Makmur Makka, a
noted writer and journalist, also expressed his view that the motivation of the
participants of the mass rally on 4 November was not necessarily a merely “anti-Ahok”
sentiment, but rather they were willing to be a part of a “trendy” religious movement
without knowing the substance of the issue.17
Having said this, the political damage that Ahok incurred was by no means trivial. The
popularity of Ahok dropped swiftly, and one of the surveys conducted after Ahok’s
comment showed that any of the three pairs competing for the governorship of DKI
Jakarta, Ahok-Djarot, Anies-Sandiaga, and Agus-Silviana, could win the election.18
Umat Divided over the Ahok Issue
The hailstorm of criticism and the demand for punishment against Ahok were
spontaneously promoted by quite a few fundamentalist groups apart from the FPI. One
of these groups was Jamaah Anshorusy Syariah (JAS). They expressed their distress
and demanded a public apology from Ahok in a statement issued on 7 October 2016.
H. A. Fallah, the leader of the Jakarta Charter of JAS, explained that the punishment
against Ahok should be twofold: religious and secular. Fallah said that although the
apology made by Ahok can be accepted, there remains the possibility of punishment
based on the national secular legal system.19 Fallah also admits that, should Ahok be
elected governor, there would be no choice for him but to accept him, as Shari'a has not
been implemented in Indonesia.20
Abdul Rohim, another prominent leader of JAS, expressed his distress that president
Jokowi is close to communist China.21 The implication of this statement is that the team
of Jokowi and the Chinese-Indonesian Ahok would weaken the position of Islam in the
country. It should be noted that the anti-communist campaign at the end of 2016
became more prevalent, with quite a few banners posted in various parts of the country.
The political nature of the Ahok issue will be discussed in the later part of this paper.
16

Interview with the author in Kalibata, 27 December 2016.
Interview with the author in Kebon Juruk, 25 December 2016.
18
According to the survey conducted by the Populi Centre, the approval rate of Ahok-Djarot is 36.7%,
while Anies-Sandi’s is 28.5% and Agus-Sylviana’s is 25%. Jakarta Post, 30 January 2017.
19
Interview with the author in Depok, 25 December 2015.
20
Interview with the author in Depok, 25 December 2015.
21
Interview with the author in Solo, 3 January 2016.
17
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Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), which aims to establish a “legitimate caliphate,” also
severely rejected Ahok. Ismail Yusanto, one of the highest executives in HTI, explained
that HTI never accepted non-Muslims as leaders and never tolerated anyone who insults
al-Quran.22 Unlike some political parties such as Partai Kadilan Sejathera (PKS), HTI
has never supported non-Muslim candidates for the provincial elections.23 Yusanto
genuinely believes that the anti-Ahok mass rallies are the expression of Muslim
determination to defend Islam. At the same time, Yusanto understands there might be
political interest behind the anti-Ahok movement; however, he believes it is still more
important to follow the Islamic duty of condemning blasphemy.
In contrast to those who reject Ahok, there are still some who support and legitimize
his political position. Abdurrahman Wahid, also known as Gus Dur (who was the fourth
president of Indonesia and a respected Muslim scholar), once conveyed his view on
non-Muslim governorship in 2007.24 Gus Dur clearly stated that one could not connect
religion and secular governorship; thus, there was no obstacle for Muslims to elect a
non-Muslim as a governor. He also added that this does not imply Muslims should
convert to Christianity when choosing a Christian governor. 25 Gus Dur’s view was
echoed by the fifth and first woman president of Indonesia, Megawati Sukarnoputri,
who stated that “we’re not voting for a religious leader. We will vote for an
administrative leader.”26
Arif Safri presented a theological argument, saying that Muslims are allowed to have
their own political decisions. He cited one of the verses of al-Quran to substantiate his
argument, that is, “If Allah so willed, He could make you all one People: but he leaves
straying whom He pleases, and He guides whom He pleases.”27 Arif also sees a
semantic problem in the Ahok issue regarding the content of al-Maidah-51. According
to Arif, who is an Arabic expert, the word “awlya” ( translated as “friends” in the
English version of al-Quran) means “close friends,” not “leader,” although some
conservative Muslims understand awlya as leader as well. Thus, Arif believes that the
anti-Ahok movement, which is attempting to delegitimize Ahok as a governor of DKI
Jakarta, has lost ground.

22

Interview with the author in Kalibata, 28 December 2016.
For example, PKS supported a non-Muslim candidate for the governor of the province of Papua
Barat in February 2017.
24
Abdurrahman Wahid was a leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia;
he died in 2009.
25
Gus Dur delivered this speech, joining Ahok’s campaign when Ahok ran for the governor of BangkaBelitung province in 2007. Full footage of his speech can viewed at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9sSAksVZFk
26
Jakarta Post, 15 March 2015.
27
al-Quran: 16-93
23
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These less-conventional interpretations of theology presented by Arif are the reflection
of his ideas that one should have a contextual understanding of Islam rather than a literal
understanding.28 This stance is echoed by other scholars who believe that contemporary
social conditions should be considered in relation to the interpretation of Islam. For
example, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im stated that “what is suggested is that the Qur’an
and Sunna have been the source of Shari’a as the Islamic response to the concrete
realities of the past and must be the source of modern Shari’a as the Islamic response
to the concrete realities of today.”29
R. Ghannouchi also believes that it is possible for Muslims to have a broader
perspective and that they could support a non-Islamic government prior to establishing
their religious government.30 Both Gus Dur and Arif seem willing to bring about a more
inclusive society with Indonesia’s socio-cultural reality in mind.
Ahmad Syafii Ma’arif, a respected Muslim scholar and former leader of the nation’s
second largest Islamic organisation, Muhammadiyah, also expressed his support for
Ahok and criticised the statement issued by MUI. He expounded that Ahok had no
intention to insult al-Quran or ulama when making his speech on Pulau Seribu in
September 2016. In his own words;
Ahok was talking about people who use al-Maidah to discourage people to vote for
him. That is why the word, “pakai” (use) is mentioned in his speech. Ahok himself
did not question the credibility of al-Quran itself at all. He did not insult al-Quran
or ulama.31
He also deplores that an exclusionary attitude of Muslim thinkers is becoming more
pervasive in Indonesia, saying that the core principle of Islam is that all existence in this
world created by Allah should be blessed and appreciated. He cites one of the verses
from al-Quran, that is, “We sent thee not, but as a Mercy for all creatures.”32 He hopes
that there will be a new generation with a “calmer” and “wiser” attitude regarding
understanding Indonesian politics, implying that a political motive is behind the Ahok
issue.33

28

Interview with the author in Kota Gede, 1 January 2017.
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation , (New York: 1996), 143-144.
30
Rachid Ghannouchi, “Participation in non-Islamic Government”, in Liberal Islam, ed. Charles
Kurzman, (New York: 1998), 91-93.
29

31

Interview with the author in Yogyakarta, 2 January, 2017.
al-Quran: 21-107
33
Ma’arif, Syafii Ahmad, Tempo, 2 December 2016
32
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The Political Side of the Ahok Issue
It is true that the momentum of the anti-Ahok movement is endorsed by a religious
sentiment of the masses. However, we still need to understand this religious
phenomenon within the political climate of Indonesia. We, in fact, find complex
political elements behind the gubernatorial election of DKI Jakarta in 2017, which was
widely believed to be the preliminary skirmish for the presidential election that will take
place in 2019. The popularity of Ahok is tacitly regarded as the approval of the
constituency for Jokowi, and it is vital for those who intend to compete with current
president Jokowi in 2019 to overtake Ahok.
Each gubernatorial candidate for DKI Jakarta in 2017 seems to have his own political
agenda. Anies is supported by a political party called Gerakan Indonesia Raya
(Gerindra), chaired by Prabowo Subianto, a former son-in-law of Suharto. The origin
of the political rivalry between Prabowo Subianto and Jokowi was firmly seeded in the
time of the presidential election in 2014, when both ran for the highest position of the
Republic of Indonesia. Despite the fact that Jokowi, then Jakarta governor with his
deputy Ahok, was declared the winner of the election, Prabowo Subianto refused to
accept the results.
Although Prabowo had to accept the decision of the Constitutional Court that
acknowledged the victory of Jokowi in the end, we can assume that Prabowo Subianto
still holds his firm ambition to take Jokowi’s position in the next presidential election
in 2019. Therefore, it was crucially important for Anies, as a representative of Prabowo,
to win the gubernatorial election in order to display the political potential of Gerindra.
Agus Yudhoyono, another candidate in the gubernatorial election of DKI Jakarta in
2017, is a son of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono desperately
needs to maintain his party’s presence in the national political arena in order to face the
presidential election in 2019. We can easily imagine that Ahok’s comment on al-Quran
could be utilised by his competitors as a political weapon to discredit Ahok. Thus, the
mobilisation of anti-Ahok rallies in October, November, and December could be the
result of a political manoeuvre to curtail the political credibility of Ahok by his
opponents.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/8
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Knowing this political nature of the Ahok issue, we need to remember one of the darkest
political memories in Indonesia, that is, the killings of Communist Party (PKI) members
in the mid-1960s.34 This incident, called Gerakan September Tiga Puluf or Gestapu, is
still regarded as taboo in Indonesia, which results in “the absence of public discussion
and careful study of the killings.”35 For Indonesians, should one be branded as a
communist or should one’s family be related to Gestapu, this means a termination of
social life in the country.
The term Gestapu invariably reminds Indonesians of the influence of China. Thus, the
combination of being Chinese and Communist is the worst social status in the country.
The greater presence of Chinese, including manual laborers, in Indonesia has been a
much debated political issue since 2016, which was the time of the gubernatorial
election. Jokowi’s administration,36 in fact, has been troubled by so-called “fake news”
in relation to Chinese migrant workers by his political opponents.37 Ahok, with his
Chinese background, is vulnerable to tacit antipathy of Gestapu and the Chinese
presence in Indonesia.
It is true that banners that read “Waspadai Bangkitnya PKI! ” (Be careful with the
revival of PKI) were ubiquitous in various parts of Indonesia in the time of the election
campaign. Needless to say, this trend can be seen as a patriotic movement that intends
to safeguard Indonesia from Communism and the economic invasion of China.
However, it is also plausible to regard this as the attempt to discredit Ahok, implying
that he is a symbol of the Chinese invasion into Indonesia and the revival of
Communism.

34

On 30 September 1965, it is said that some Communist members attempted to seize power in a coup
d’état. However, they were swiftly subdued by General Suharto, and it resulted in the fall of Sukarno,
the first president of Indonesia, and the mass killing of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)
members and their sympathisers.
35
John Rosa, Pretext for Mass Murder, (London: 2006), 24.
36
For example, Fadli Zon, vice-speaker of the parliament and secretary general of Gerindra expressed
his concern that an increase of the Chinese labour force would be a “threat” to the Indonesian local
labour market. See, Parlementaria, Edisi 145th, XLVII 2017, pp.8-9.
37
In December 2016, Joko Widodo gave instructions to investigate the source of the “fake news” that
reported that 10 million Chinese workers had already entered Indonesia, which was untrue. The Straits
Times, 10 January, 2017
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017
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The End of Tolerance?
Ahok appeared to be the most popular candidate among the three contenders, with
42.96% of the vote, while Anies and Agus obtained 39.97% and 17.06% respectively
when the first round of the election took place on 15 February 2017.38 As none of the
candidates were successful in obtaining 50% of the vote, the first two candidates, that
is, Ahok and Anies, proceeded to the final round of the election on 19 April 2017. The
final choice of the constituency of Jakarta was Anies, who received 57.95% of the votes,
while Ahok obtained 42.05% of them.39
Some may perceive this as an apprehensive development in the country in relation to
religious harmony.40 However, it is too hasty to conclude that this is the end of religious
tolerance in Indonesia. First of all, we should remember that the margin between the
two candidates in the final round of the election was rather slim, with a difference of
less than 900,000. This suggests that there is still a vast amount of Muslims who voted
for Ahok, a non-Muslim.
Secondly, Nahdulatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, which are the two most
influential Muslim organisations in the country, have maintained carefully disciplined
composure regarding the Ahok issue. Both organizations cautiously called on their
members not to be influenced by political propaganda.41 For example, Said Aqil Siradj,
the chairperson of NU, clearly stated that the members of NU would not be allowed to
participate in an anti-Ahok Rally in November, while Muhammadiyah discouraged their
members from joining it.42 In addition, NU warmly accepted Ahok to their prayer,
which was held at al-Huda Mosque, even after Ahok made a comment on al-Quran in
September 2016.43

38
Indonesian Election Commission Official website:
https://pilkada2017.kpu.go.id/hasil/t1/dki_jakarta( last accessed on 3 May 2017)
39
Indonesian Election Commission Official website:
https://pilkada2017.kpu.go.id/hasil/2/t1/dki_jakarta (last accessed on 3 May 2017) The website also
shows the total number of votes for the two candidates, that is, 3,240,332 votes for Anies and 2,351,245
votes for Ahok.
40
The Economist reported on this election with a headline that reads: “A tense election threatens
Indonesia’s religious tolerance”. It also says that “Mr Baswedan(Anies) is not about to impose Islamic
law in Jakarta. But hardline forces helped him win. That genie is not easily returned to the bottle”. See,
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21721144-hardline-muslim-agitators-help-defeat-christianincumbent-tense-election-threatens
41
Prior to the final round of the election, Said Aqil Siradj, the chairperson of NU, expressed the
political neutrality of NU, saying that “if you are happy with Ahok, choose Ahok, and if you are happy
with Anies, choose Anies. http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/76818/kiai-said-islam-agama-mulia-belalahdengan-cara-mulia (last accessed 4 June, 2017)
42
Jakarta Post, 1 November 2016.
43
Jakarta Post, 6 February, 2017.
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Taufiq Damas, a young NU activist, also showed his support for Ahok, saying that
“Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) has shown great attention to Muslims in his
achievement…” 44 Taufiq also emphasised that the Republic’s constitution, which has
never prevented anyone from taking a governmental position regardless of religion,
should be appreciated.45
Thirdly, we need to understand the temperamental influence of religion over the attitude
of the Indonesian people. Before Ahok made his comment on al-Maida 51 in
September 2016, his popularity was high enough to assure his governorship.46 The
author also conducted unofficial interviews with some residents of Jakarta in March
2016; the interviewees included taxi drivers, food venders, and shop clerks. It is no
exaggeration to say that 8 out of 10 of these people showed support to Ahok. However,
Ahok’s popularity dropped rapidly after the Pulau Seribu incident in September 2016.
This means that his comment on al-Quran offended the feelings of Muslims.
Nonetheless, we have already observed that Ahok managed to secure most of his votes
in the first round of the election, and much of Ahok’s support came from Muslims.
Muslims who still support Ahok after the incident of September 2016 possess their own
steadfast religious and political attitudes, which are on their face tolerant and moderate.
However, it is important to note that there are certain Muslims who swung to the antiAhok camp after the incident. It can be assumed that these Muslims have not
established their own firm religious and political positions, and we might call them the
“vacillating mass.” They are by no means so-called fundamentalists who endorse
religious rigidity. They are, however, more vulnerable to “fake news.”
It is more precise to say that their emotions have been stirred by Ahok’s comment, and
they feel that Islam was insulted. Furthermore, religion has a way of making people
emotional, for they feel that their existence itself is denied when their faith is
downplayed. This “offended feeling,” in fact, brought the vacillating mass to the antiAhok side, without a serious examination of what was intended by Ahok. In other
words, should there be an event that reflects positively on Islam, they would have a
favorable emotional response towards whoever brought about that event.

44

Jakarta Post, 22 October, 2016.
Ibid.
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According to one of the surveys, the approval rate for Ahok in March 2016 was 59.3%. See: Jakarta
Post, 7 October 2016.
45

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017

11

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 77 [2017], No. 77, Art. 8

88

Number 77, Fall 2017

It is interesting to see the survey that shows the degree of satisfaction of Jakarta
residents towards the performance of Ahok’s government. Although Ahok was not
chosen as a governor, the survey conducted by Lembaga Survei Indonesia (Indonesia
Survey Organization) right before the election shows that the satisfaction rate towards
Ahok’s administration reached 73 %.47 This might suggest that the trend against Ahok
is caused by impulsive emotional reactions and is, thus, temporary. Furthermore, the
emotional effect of religion might have diverted some Muslim voters from supporting
Ahok.
Conclusion
The Ahok issue is far from over as the North Jakarta District Court found Ahok guilty
of blasphemy and sentenced him to two years of imprisonment on 9 May 2017. After
the verdict, Ahok expressed his intention to appeal to the higher court. It will take a
rather longer period to bring his struggle to an end.
It is true that the Ahok issue has presented a serious challenge to religious tolerance in
Indonesia; however, it is misleading to conclude that the result of the gubernatorial
election in 2017 automatically means the termination of Indonesia’s tradition of
religious harmony. Statistics shows that Ahok still has a significant supporters who are
presumably Muslim. In addition, influential Islamic organizations, such as NU, still
maintain a rather tolerant attitude towards Ahok. The Ahok issue is deeply related to
secular politics, including the presidential election in 2019. It is more correct to
understand the anti-Ahok movement in relation to the political reality in the country
rather than the substantial religious attitude of the people.
Most important, however, we should remember that the anti-Ahok trend has been
influenced by a volatile aspect of religion, which incites the emotions of its followers.
This factor moved the vacillating mass to adopt a seemingly intolerant attitude.
Nonetheless, this sort of emotional reaction can be impetuous. Yet, the possibility of
the most populous Muslim country, Indonesia, becoming more intolerant cannot be
ruled out, for the “vacillating masses” could come to possess a more exclusive ideology
towards non-Muslims. Thus, it is vital that Muslim scholars such as Syafiie Ma’arif
and Afrif, mentioned above, constantly exhibit their inclusive and tolerant views
towards non-Muslims, reminding all Muslims of the importance of being rational in
relation to Islamic practice, just as a noted Muslim scholar, Nurcholish Madjid,
encouraged Muslim intellectuals to pursue a progressive attitude in thinking.

47

13 April 2017, Detik.com News
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